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Abstract: This paper deals with the phenomenon of Jihadist foreign terrorist fighters 
from the perspective of East Central European countries. Over the past 
decade, the term ‘foreign terrorist fighter’ has become established in 
scholarly literature, international law and the popular consciousness. 
Today, Jihadist foreign terrorist fighters are closely watched globally for 
the security threat they pose. Although the greatest danger in Europe is 
seen to be to nations in the west, several cases in East Central Europe 
– involving terrorists travelling through the region and attempting to 
radicalise local jihadists – have led Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic to adopt important legislation to eliminate this threat. 
Abstrakt: Článek se zabývá fenoménem džihádistických zahraničních teroristických 
bojovníků z perspektivy zemí středovýchodní Evropy. V odborné litera-
tuře i v mezinárodním právu se pojem „zahraniční teroristický bojovník 
etabloval“ v posledním desetiletí. V současnosti jsou v globálním rámci 
sledovanou entitou džihádističtí zahraniční terorističtí bojovníci. Předsta-
vují bezpečnostní hrozbu i pro země Visegrádské skupiny, a to jak z hle-
diska cestování přes jejich území, tak i z hlediska radikalizace domácích 
džihádistů. Několik dosavadních případů v zemích středovýchodní Evropy 
však zatím nepředstavuje tak závažnou hrozbu, jakou je tento fenomén 
v západní Evropě. Nicméně Polsko, Maďarsko, Slovensko i Česká republi-
ka přijaly důležitá legislativní opatření k eliminaci této hrozby. 
Key words: Foreign Terrorist Fighters; Jihadism; Counter-terrorism; East Central 
Europe; Inter-Agency Cooperation.
Klíčová slova: Zahraniční terorističtí bojovníci; boj proti terorismu; středovýchodní Ev-
ropa; meziresortní spolupráce. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent political discourse in East Central Europe, Jihadist terrorist foreign fighters 
have been discussed as a serious security threat. The aim of this paper is to analyse the 
various dimensions of this threat and to explain how it has challenged recent legislation 
and security structures in the region. In this paper, East Central Europe is understood 
to cover the so-called Visegrád Group countries (Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Hungary). The impact of global and European influences on the situation in the centre of 
the „old continent“ is taken into account.
The paper starts with methodological and conceptual issues. The development of the 
phenomenon of Jihadist foreign fighters in relation to East Central Europe is described 
with the aim of explaining the recent new dimension of the threat. The following part 
deals with the reaction of the legal sphere within the global and European context of law 
changes. Specific challenges posed by Jihadist foreign fighters to the security systems 
in V4 countries are discussed with the aim of formulating basic recommendations for 
policy makers.
The complex character of the researched subject and the specific points discussed 
in individual sections below require a broad spectrum of methodological approaches. 
The historical method and description is used for an overview of the development of 
the issue of foreign terrorist fighters from an East Central European point of view. A risk 
and threat analysis serves as an assessment of the recent situation. Simple legal logic is 
applied in the section about legal changes. Basic strategic and policy analyses are used 
in relation to strategic culture and infrastructure.
1 CONCEPTUALISING FOREIGN FIGHTERS
The first very important challenge is that of conceptualising and defining Jihadist fo-
reign terrorist fighters. Analytically, we can divide this composite term into three parts. 
Firstly, the „traditional“ concept of „foreign fighters“ will be described. Secondly, the 
specific dimension of foreign „terrorist“ fighters (in contrast to „non-terrorist“ foreign 
fighters) will be explained and, thirdly, „Jihadist“ foreign fighters will be distinguished 
from other variants.
The concept of foreign fighters has been widely and broadly discussed in recent litera-
ture, however, a generally accepted definition, or a list of criteria, has not been created 
(which is typical of many crucial terms in the social sciences). In this article, we start 
with a basic working definition taken from the book by David Malet. He defines foreign 
fighters as „non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflicts“.1 
1  MALET, David. 2013. Foreign Fighters. Transnational Identity in Civil Conflicts, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford.
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Malet excludes from his definition members of foreign governmental forces involved 
in a civil conflict2 as well as mercenaries and contractors. However, the line between vo-
luntary participation and providing a service for remuneration is in many cases unclear. 
To improve the definition, the consideration of the strong role played by voluntary par-
ticipation due to identifying with the goal of the warring party should be added (and 
a significant pecuniary motivation is not excluded). 
Malet’s criterion of „insurgencies“ is questionable.3 Firstly, due to the difficult iden-
tification of insurgency in recent conflicts (where for example many non-state armed 
groups fight in symmetrical conflicts); and secondly, due to the fact that foreign volun-
teers can also join the governmental forces in the conflict.4 The issue of non-citizenship 
can also be questioned, in cases when the fighters are granted citizenship of the state or 
quasi-state for which they fight.5 
In the light of these facts, in this article foreign fighters are defined as persons who 
predominantly take part voluntarily in a warring faction in an armed conflict outside 
the country of their residence and who do not serve in the conflict area as members of 
their own country’s military or other security forces. Voluntary participation distingui-
shes them from mercenaries and contractors (with respect to the flexible definitions of 
these categories). Service in the armed units of warring factions and not in the armed 
or other security forces of their home state distinguishes them from participants in fore-
ign interventions or peace-enforcement or peace-keeping missions of the international 
community.
In Malet’s above-mentioned definition, the issue of a diaspora is missing. In fact, we 
can distinguish between foreign fighters from a diaspora with a direct link to a warring 
party (for example, people from the second generation of emigrants who belonged to 
the ethnic group whose representatives are fighting in a civil war) and foreign fighters 
without previous close ties to the geopolitical area of the conflict. In the case of Islamist 
foreign fighters the construction of the „global Ummah“ plays an important role and Is-
lamist fighters may feel a connection to all territories claimed by Islamists. Hegghammer 
distinguishes between foreign fighters from the same region as the conflict (for example, 
2  He considers the real situation, not the possible officially presented but false information about 
alleged volunteers, who are in fact members of regular forces (as, for example, the combatants 
from the German and Italian armed forces who were involved in the Spanish Civil War). Ibid.
3  In a similar way, Thomas Hegghammer uses the criterion of insurgency. He works with four 
criteria, defining a foreign fighter “as an agent who (1) has joined, and operates within the 
confines of, an insurgency, (2) lacks citizenship of the conflict state and kinship links to its 
warring factions, (3) lacks affiliation to an official military organisation, and (4) is unpaid.” 
HEGGHAMMER, Thomas. 2010. The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization 
of Jihad. International Security, Vol. 35, No. 3 (Winter 2010/11), pp. 53-93.
4  As foreign volunteers in governmental forces in Ukraine, for example. See MAREŠ, Miroslav. 
Czech Foreign Fighters in the Ukrainian Conflict: Legal Aspects and Propagandist Use. Vojenské 
rozhledy. Vol. 26, special issue: 71-82, doi:10.3849/2336-2995.26.2017.05.071-082. 
5  RAČIUS, Egdūnas. 2017. Caliphate Citizens. In REKAWEK, Kacper: Not Only Syria? The 
Phenomenon of Foreign Fighters in a Comparative Perspective. Amsterdam: IOS Press, 52-59. 
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Pakistanis fighting in Afghanistan) and global foreign fighters (they travel to conflict zo-
nes from different regions, for example Algerian fighters in Afghanistan).6
2 CONCEPTUALISING FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS 
While the phenomenon of „foreign fighters“ and the term itself are relatively old, the 
newly coined term „foreign terrorist fighters“ (FTFs) was created in international politics 
and law. This term is used in international as well as national legal documents; however, 
it is not precisely defined in international law.7 The definition of foreign terrorist figh-
ters is included in „The Hague-Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More 
Effective Response to the FTF Phenomenon“, which was adopted by the Foreign Terrorist 
Fighters Initiative of the Global Counterterrorism Forum. FTFs are defined as „individuals 
who travel abroad to a state other than their states of residence or nationality to engage 
in, undertake, plan, prepare, carry out or otherwise support terrorist activity or to provi-
de or receive training to do so (often labelled as ‘terrorist training’).“8
The word „terrorist“ in this definition is mostly linked with the preparation of terrorist 
acts. However, it is also important to take into account the character and labelling of 
an armed group. Individually, foreign fighters might take part in military combat only 
(insurgency, symmetrical battles with various types of weapons, including heavy wea-
pons), while their organisations are nevertheless also responsible for terrorist activities. 
These fighters can also be directly engaged in terrorist or repressive activities in the area 
of the combat (atrocities aimed against religious or ethnic groups, perpetrated against 
prisoners of war etc.). They make use of these various experiences to commit crimes af-
ter their return (the so-called „returnees“, including their family members, are a serious 
concern in Western countries today).
Foreign terrorist fighters are considered a security threat due to their direct partici-
pation in armed conflicts and linked atrocities (executions of prisoners, rape of women 
representing specific groups etc.), their potential to radicalise other people (from the 
conflict area or after their return) and their potential to be involved in terrorist or other 
violent activities after their return. However, not all returnees are a priori terrorists. 
Dutch expert Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn divides foreign fighters from the Western 
point of view into several categories included in the following schema – table 1. 
6  HEGGHAMMER 2010. 
7  BÍLKOVÁ, Veronika. 2018. Foreign Terrorist Fighters and International Law. Groningen Journal 
of International Law. Vol 6, No 1: 1-23. DOI: 10.21827/5b51d51a22ac3.
8  FOREIGN TERRORIST INITIATIVE, GLOBAL COUNTERTERRORISM FORUM. 2014. The Hague-
Marrakech Memorandum on Good Practices for a More Effective Response to the FTF 
Phenomenon. Available at: https://www.thegctf.org/documents/10162/140201/14Sept19_
The+Hague-Marrakech+FTF+Memorandum.pdf.
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Table 1: Typology of foreign fighters according to Jeanine de Roy van Zuijdewijn
Martyr A foreign fighter who joins a conflict and is killed on the battlefield. He or she will pose no further risk to the country of origin unless the martyrdom itself is used as a recruiting tool.
Veteran
An experienced fighter who continues fighting in other theatres of conflict. He sees jihad 
as a way of life. While he is a risk to people in conflict zones, he is no risk to the country of 
origin in the West.
Recruiter
The recruiter is usually a former foreign fighter who returned home to recruit others to 
fight, often quite successfully because of his or her ‘street credibility’… Generally speaking, 
they are not directly involved in terrorist activity but are frequently seen as spiritual guides 




He/she is the one-time foreign fighter. After the conflict or his role in it has ended, the rein-
tegrated fighter will return and resume his pre-departure life or will at least not be involved 
in terrorist activity…They are usually no risk to the country of origin.
Terrorist
When he/she comes into contact with terrorist networks in conflict zones, he/she becomes 
convinced that it is not only a priority to fight for the oppressed abroad, but also to target 
the country of origin. This type of foreign fighter not infrequently converts to Islam, under-
goes the most fundamental shift in identity and norms and poses a direct threat to the 
country of origin.
Source: ZUIJDEWIJN, Jeanine de Roy van. The Foreign Fighters’ Thre-
at: What History Can (not) Tell Us. Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 8, No. 5: 59-73, 
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/378/html
Family members (women, children) are also sometimes affiliated with foreign figh-
ters. Women may travel to conflict areas individually with non-combatant goals (mostly 
to marry Jihadists) and may take part in combat. Some of these women’s activities are 
on the boundary between combatant and non-combatant categories (for example, in 
religious militias enforcing Sharia law). Child soldiers under the command of Jihadist 
terrorists constitute another category.9
Foreign fighters have been engaged in several recent armed conflicts. The term „te-
rrorism“ is used, misused and relativised in relation to various categories of foreign figh-
ter (on both sides of the conflict in the Donbass, on the Kurdish side in the Syrian war10 
etc.). This article deals only with Jihadist foreign fighters. Jihadism is understood as a fa-
natic religious-ideological motive for militant violent struggle in the name of Islam again-
st enemies (who can also be Muslims who are designated as „takfir“, as apostates).11
In his research into developments until 2015, Raphaël Leduc found that „the presen-
ce of foreign fighters does not raise the likelihood that a terrorist plot will be executed 
and if it is, then they have no impact on the number of casualties as a consequence 
of that plot. Overall, this means that foreign fighters do not increase the operational 
9  SUŠOVSKÁ, Patricie. 2107. Dětští vojáci v propagandě Islámského státu – proměny v čase. 
In BUREŠ, Oldřich (ed.): Sborník vybraných příspěvků z 9. výroční studentské konference 
bezpečnostního výzkumu. Praha: Metropolitan University Prague Press, 48-57. Available at: 
https://www.c4ss.cz/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Sbornik-studentska-konference-2017.pdf.
10  ORTON, Kyle. 2017. The Forgotten Foreign Fighters: The PKK in Syria. London: The Henry Jackson 
Society. Available at: http://henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/3053-PYD-
Foreign-Fighter-Project-1.pdf.
11  SCHMIDINGER, Thomas. 2015. Jihadismus. Ideologie, Prävention und Deradikalisierung. Wien: 
Mandelbaum Verlag. 
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effectiveness of a terrorist cell in a way that is different from any other member of the 
population that joins the cell.“12 However, several cases of terrorist attacks committed by 
returned foreign fighters under the umbrella of the so-called Islamic State (in Paris and 
Brussels) make this kind of terrorist returnee with Islamic State links a matter of specific 
concern.13 
3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE PHENOMENON OF JIHADIST FOREIGN 
FIGHTERS FROM THE EAST CENTRAL EUROPEAN POINT OF VIEW 
Muslim (not only Jihadist) foreign fighters have fought in many historical conflicts. The 
modern phenomenon of Jihadist FTFs can be divided into four main historical waves. 
The first wave was initiated by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Jihadists from various 
countries resisted the Soviet occupation forces and the Afghan government in the 1980 s 
and some of them turned to terrorist activities against the West in the early 1990 s (the 
term „mujahideen“ was popularised at that time). The second wave is connected mostly 
with Jihadist volunteers in the Balkan and Caucasian wars of the 1990 s. The third wave 
started after US campaign in Afghanistan in 2001 and especially of Iraq in 2003. The 
fourth wave was caused by the outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2011; the proclamation 
of a „Caliphate“ by the Islamic State had a specific impact on its intensification (however, 
foreign fighters were – or still are – also engaged in other Islamist groups in the area). 
This categorisation is very simplified; there are conflicts with limited numbers of Jihadist 
foreign fighters in Yemen, Somalia, West Africa etc. 14
The threat of foreign terrorist fighters has global scope. In 2014, the Security Council 
of the United Nations was concerned that „foreign terrorist fighters increase the inten-
sity, duration and intractability of conflicts, and also may pose a serious threat to their 
states of origin, the states they transit and the states to which they travel, as well as 
states neighbouring the zones of armed conflict in which foreign terrorist fighters are 
active and that are affected by serious security burdens, and noting that the threat of 
foreign terrorist fighters may affect all regions and Member States, even those far from 
12  LEDUC, Raphaël. 2016. Are returning foreign fighters dangerous? Re-investigating 
Hegghammer’s assessment of the impact of veteran foreign fighters on the operational 
effectiveness of domestic terrorism. Journal of Military and Strategic Studies. Vol. 17, Issue 1, 
83-103.
13  BRZUSZKIEWICZ, Sara. 2018. Radicalisation in Europe after the fall of Islamic State: Trends and 
risks. European View, Vol. 17, No. 2: 145-154.. 
14  This categorisation is based mostly on the following publications: FAINBERG, Alisa. 2017. Here 
We Come: The Evolution of Foreign Fighters’ Flow to Syria and Iraq in 2013-2016. Herzlyia: 
International Institute for Counterterrorism. Available at: https://www.ict.org.il/Article/1954/
the-evolution-of-foreign-fighters#gsc.tab=0; NESSER, Petter. 2018. Islamist Terrorism in 
Europe. London: Hurst & Company; SCHMID, Alex P. 2015. Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters with 
IS: A European Perspective. Hague: International Centre for Counter-Terrorism. Available at: 
https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ICCT-Schmid-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighters-with-IS-
A-European-Perspective-December2015.pdf.
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conflict zones, and expressing grave concern that foreign terrorist fighters are using their 
extremist ideology to promote terrorism.“15 
However, some regions have not been significantly affected by the phenomenon 
of foreign terrorist fighters and particularly Jihadist FTFs. East Central Europe is one of 
them. Paradoxically, several individuals from Poland could be considered modern fore-
ign fighters with links to Jihadism; however, they are not terrorists. At least three Poles 
with anti-communist ideological aims joined the Afghan mujahedeen in the 1980 s and 
fought against the Soviets. Only one of them – Lech Zondek – emigrated from Poland 
during the Afghan war. He was killed in 1985. The other two were earlier emigrants to 
the West.16 Similar cases from other East Central European countries are not known.
FTFs from the Caucasian and Balkan wars in the 1990 s were not a significant security 
threat to East Central European countries. Their routes to the conflict area and back led 
through other territories. A small change can be observed in the 2000 s. Two different 
cases of men with alleged battle experience or at least training in the Afghan conflict 
area (related to Al-Qaeda or the Taliban) were connected with East Central Europe; ho-
wever, this was only from the point of view of transit or short-term residence. In the 
Czech Republic Oussama Kassir was detained in 2005 and was extradited to the United 
States two years later. There he was sentenced to life for several acts linked to preparing 
terrorist activities.17 More complicated was the case of the Algerian citizen, Mustafa Lab-
si, who was detained in Slovakia in 2007 under an Algerian warrant and, after his trial, 
was extradited to Algeria. The European Court of Human Rights found this extradition 
unlawful in 2012.18
4 THE CONTEMPORARY SITUATION IN EAST CENTRAL EUROPE 
After the beginning of the Syrian civil war, the phenomenon of Jihadist foreign terror-
ist fighters started to be a more serious problem in East Central Europe. Of course, West-
ern Europe was hit much more heavily; however, the interdependency of contemporary 
global and European security meant that the Visegrád countries were also challenged. 
15  UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL. 2014. Resolution 2178 (2014) adopted by the Security 
Council at its 7272nd meeting on 24 September 2014 “Threats to international peace and 
security caused by terrorist acts”. Available at: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/2178.
16  STANIUL, Michal. 2016. Polscy mudżahedini na wojnie w Afganistanie 1979-1989. WP Online. 
Available at: https://opinie.wp.pl/polscy-mudzahedini-na-wojnie-w-afganistanie-1979-1989-
6126041611622529a.
17  US ATTORNEY’S OFFICE. 2009. Swedish Citizen Oussama Kassir Found Guilty of Providing 
Material Support to al Qaeda. FBI: New York Field Office. Available at: https://archives.fbi.gov/
archives/newyork/press-releases/2009/nyfo051209.htm.
18  EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS. 2012. Case of Labsi vs. Slovakia. Application no. 
33809/08. Judgement. Available at: https://www.asylumlawdatabase.eu/sites/default/files/
aldfiles/CASE%20OF%20LABSI%20v.%20SLOVAKIA.pdf.
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From the point of view of these countries, the security threat of the Jihadist FTFs can be 
divided into three main interconnected issues: 
1. Travel of Western European Jihadist foreign fighters and their family members to 
Syria and Iraq via East Central Europe; 
2. Return of Jihadist FTFs and their family members to Western Europe and Eastern 
Europe19 via East Central Europe (of special importance are the terrorist fighters 
with a clear intention to commit terrorist attacks);
3.  Radicalisation, recruitment and travel of home-grown East Central European Jiha-
dists to conflict areas (these people can be divided into converts and members of 
immigrant Muslim communities) and their return (of special importance are the 
threats and possible intention to commit terrorist attacks in this area). 
Travel by Western Jihadists to the Syrian conflict started in 2011 and law enforcement 
forces and intelligence services in East Central Europe monitored dozens of travellers.20 
The issue of returning Jihadist FTFs has become a matter of alarming importance since 
the start of the migration crisis and the wave of terrorist attacks in Western Europe in 
2015-2018. The defeat of the Islamic State and imprisonment of many Jihadist fighters 
by Kurdish, Syrian and Iraqi forces constitute a new challenge to European security (with, 
however, only a limited impact on East Central Europe, in contrast to significant Western 
European concerns).21
Returnees to Western Europe with terrorist goals used East Central Europe for trave-
lling, for a short recuperation and possibly also for logistics. Salah Abdeslam, who was an 
important member of the IS commando, which committed terror attacks in Paris in No-
vember 2015, visited Hungary and Slovakia (where he allegedly stayed for three weeks) 
in summer 2015.22 Another case is linked with Hungary. A 27-year-old Syrian national 
was detained at Budapest Airport on 30 December 2018. According to the Eurojust, he 
was „suspected of active involvement in the killing of 20 persons. He was imprisoned 
19  Eastern Europe is mentioned due to alleged cases of some Caucasian and Middle 
Asian Jihadist foreign fighters travelling. According to Europol: “an FTF of Chechen 
origin with refugee status in Poland was detained in 2017, charged with participation 
in a foreign military organisation and illegal possession of weapons and ammunition” 
Europol. 2018. European Union Terrorism Situation & Trend Report (Te-Sat). The Hague: 
Europol. Available at: https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/
european-union-terrorism-situation-and-trend-report-2018-tesat-2018.
20  Exact data are still classified. The number of these persons can be assessed at around 60 in 
all V4 countries (around 20 in the Czech Republic). This assessment is based on information 
from informal interviews conducted by the author of this article with members of security 
institutions, journalists and academics during international counter-terrorist events. See also 
sources below.
21  RENARD, Thomas. 2019. Quelle justice pour les djihadistes belges ? Le Vif. Available at: 
https://www.levif.be/actualite/international/quelle-justice-pour-les-djihadistes-belges/article-
opinion-1100939.html?cookie_check=1557831251.
22  CRIME TERROR NEXUS. 2018. The Crime-Terror Nexus in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. 
Available at: https://crimeterrornexus.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Crime-Terror-
Nexus-in-the-Czech-Republic-Slovakia_English-Version.pdf.
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for using forged travel documents for both himself and his female partner.“23 This FTF 
should be extradited to Belgium. In Poland, Moroccan citizen Mourad T. was sentenced 
by the court of first instance in March 2019 to three years in prison due to the help he 
gave to the Islamic state. He probably did not serve in Syria or Iraq; however, he co-
operated with the Belgian foreign terrorist fighter Abdelhamid Abaaoud, who organised 
terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015. Mourad T. recruited and helped Jihadist migrants on the 
Balkan route.24 He married in Poland and travelled to various places, including Hungary 
and the Czech Republic.
Home-grown radicalised Jihadists who travelled from East Central European countries 
to the conflict areas can be divided into two main categories. Firstly they are converts 
from majority traditional nations in East Central Europe25 (several cases of individuals 
from the Polish diaspora in Western European countries can also be found).26 Secondly, 
they are members of Middle Eastern or Caucasian diasporas living in East Central Euro-
pean countries.27 Polish experts Ryzsard Machnikowski and Artur Legiec estimate the 
number of Jihadist FTFs at between 20 and 40.28 The Security Information Service of the 
23  EUROJUST. 2018. IS terrorist suspect arrested in Hungary, available at: http://www.eurojust.
europa.eu/press/PressReleases/Pages/2019/2019-03-22b.aspx.
24  DRABEK, Patryk. 2019. Marokańczyk który mieszkał na Śląsku oskarżony o współpracę z ISIS - 
koniec procesu [WYROK]. Naszemiasto.pl, Available at: http://katowice.naszemiasto.pl/artykul/
marokanczyk-ktory-mieszkal-na-slasku-oskarzony-o-wspolprace,5047715,artgal,t,id,tm.html.
25  The Czech convert Jan Silovský travelled to join IS in Syria in 2016; however, he was detained in 
Turkey and later sentenced to six years in prison in the Czech Republic. NEJVYŠŠÍ SOUD ČR. 2018. 
Rozhodnutí 3 Tdo 1073/2017. ECLI:CZ:NS:2017:3.TDO.1073.2017.1 The Polish convert Jakub 
Jakus joined IS and was probably killed in 2017 (he used the name Abu Khattab-al Polandi). 
CEYROWSKI, Artur. 2017. Abu Khattab al-Polandi nie żyje? O śmierć dżihadysty pytamy Marcina 
Mamonia, autora książki „Wojna braci”. Pressmania.pl. Available at: http://pressmania.pl/abu-
khattab-al-polandi-nie-zyje-o-smierc-dzihadysty-pytamy-marcina-mamonia-autora-ksiazki-
wojna-braci/.
26  Polish expert Jan Wójcik identified Jacek S., who migrated to Germany in 2005, converted in 
2014, soon thereafter joined IS and died in 2015 (in a suicide attack in Iraq) and Dawid Ł. (Abu 
Hanifa) from the Polish diaspora in Norway, who in 2014 allegedly joined Harakat Fajr al-Sham 
al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Movement Dawn of Syria) and in 2019 was arrested for allegedly 
preparing a terrorist attack in Poland (judicial proceedings are ongoing). WÓJCIK, Jan. 2019. 
Returning Foreign Fighters in Central and Eastern Europe. European Eye on Radicalisation. 
Available at: https://eeradicalization.com/returning-foreign-fighters-in-central-and-eastern-
europe/.Three other Jihadist foreign fighters had their origin in families of the Polish diaspora 
in Germany. See MACHNIKOWSKI, Ryszard. – LEGIEĆ, Artur. 2017. The Favored Conflicts of 
Foreign Fighters From Central Europe. Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 15, No. 10, available at: https://
jamestown.org/program/favored-conflicts-foreign-fighters-central-europe/.
27  A specific “mixed case” is connected with the former Prague imam, of half-Czech half-
Palestinian origin, Samer Shehadeh, who arranged the travel of his brother Omar and one 
Czech female convert to Syria. They married in Syria and joined the Jabhat Fatah al-Sham in 
2016. Samer Shehadeh is in custody in the Czech Republic, suspected of having supported 
terrorism (however, he himself was not an FTF). MINISTERSTVO VNITRA ČR. 2019. Zpráva o 
projevech extremismu a předsudečné nenávisti na území České republiky v roce 2018. Praha: 
Ministerstvo vnitra ČR. Available at: https://www.mvcr.cz/clanek/extremismus-vyrocni-zpravy-
o-extremismu-a-strategie-boje-proti-extremismu.aspx.
28  MACHNIKOWSKI, Ryszard. – LEGIEĆ, Artur. 2017.
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Czech Republic reported about 16 people from the Czech Republic (including two with 
Czech citizenship) in terrorist organisations in the Middle East.29 Between 10 and 15 FTFs 
from Hungary fought in various Islamist groups in Syria (mostly in al-Qaeda affiliates in 
Syria; information about the participation of Hungarian fighters in the Islamic state is 
unavailable).30 The Slovak Information Service reported Jihadist foreign terrorist fighters 
with links to the Slovak Republic, but without specifying an exact number.31 Earlier, six 
Slovak foreign fighters were reported in the documents.32 
5 THE CHALLENGES TO LEGAL AND SECURITY SYSTEMS
Foreign terrorist fighters pose a challenge to international as well as national legal sys-
tems. The internationalisation and Europeanisation of criminal law characterise the legal 
approach taken vis-à-vis this phenomenon in East Central European countries. Political 
and legal actions were adopted by the United Nations, which placed requirements on 
member countries. The most important international documents with global impact are 
Security Council Resolution 2178 (2014), followed by Security Council Resolution 2396 
(2017).33
The European Union responded to the phenomenon of FTFs with many broadly-fo-
cused counter-terrorist measures.34 The most important piece of European law is the 
Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on combating terrorism which 
replaced Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amended Council Decision 
2005/671/JHA from 23 February 2017. According to the directive, each member state 
29  BEZPEČNOSTNÍ INFORMAČNÍ SLUŽBA. 2018. Výroční zpráva Bezpečnostní informační služby za 
rok 2017. Available at: https://www.bis.cz/public/site/bis.cz/content/vyrocni-zpravy/2017-vz-
cz.pdf.
30  According to unconfirmed information, some Hungarians also fought in pro-Assad units. 
PÓCZIK, Szilveszter. 2017. Muslim radicals from the Balkans and Hungary in the Syrian war – A 
comparative study with focus on social history and security policy. In: PLYWACZEWSKI, Emil 
W. – GUZIK-MAKARUK, Ewa M. (eds.): Current problems of the penal law and criminology / 
Aktuelle Probleme des Strafrechts und der Kriminologie. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo C.H. Beck, 
708–722.
31  SLOVENSKÁ INFORMAČNÁ SLUŽBA. 2018. Správa o činnosti SIS za rok 2017, http://www.sis.gov.
sk/pre-vas/sprava-o-cinnosti-2017.html.
32  GINKEL, Bibi van et al. 2016. The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union. 
Profiles, Threats & Policies. Hague: International Center for Counter-Terrorism, https://icct.
nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Report_Foreign-Fighters-Phenomenon-in-the-EU_1-
April-2016_including-AnnexesLinks.pdf.
33  Improvement of the UN measures is included in the following resolution: UNITED NATIONS 
SECURITY COUNCIL. 2017. Resolution 2396 (2017) Adopted by the Security Council at its 
8148th meeting, on 21 December 2017 “Threats to international peace and security caused by 
terrorist acts – foreign terrorist fighters”, https://undocs.org/en/S/RES/2396(2017).
34  EUROPEAN UNION. 2019. Response to the terrorist threat and recent terrorist attacks in 
Europe. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/
foreign-fighters/.
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shall take necessary measures to ensure that travelling to another country for the pur-
pose of committing, or contributing to the commission of, a terrorist offence, for the 
purpose of the participation in the activities of a terrorist group with knowledge of the 
fact that such participation will contribute to the criminal activities of such a group or for 
the purpose of providing or receiving training for terrorism, is punishable as a criminal 
offence when committed intentionally.35 All EU member states (including V4 countries) 
must transfer the content of the directive into their national criminal law. With the ex-
ception of Poland, the rest of the Visegrád countries also ratified the important Addition-
al Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism.36
The improvement and Europeanisation of law in the field of foreign fighters has been 
typical of East Central European countries in recent years.37 Changes in national law 
reflect the EU requirements (criminalisation of activity in a terrorist group, crossing 
borders with terrorist aims, terrorist training etc.) but the new challenges discussed in 
Western Europe have not seriously affected the legal norms in V4 countries (for the legal 
measures for preventing the return of individuals suspected of involvement in terrorism 
abroad,38 stripping of citizenship,39 de-radicalisation programmes for returnees,40 etc.). 
This is due to the very limited scope of some problems in comparison with Western Eu-
ropean countries (few FTFs, very few FTF family members etc.).
The phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters demands international police and intel-
ligence cooperation. All Visegrád countries are members of the special Europol network 
of anti-terrorism contact points “specifically dedicated to the sharing of information 
35  EUROPEAN UNION. 2017. Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
combating terrorism, replacing Council Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and amending 
Council Decision 2005/671/JHA.
36  COUNCIL OF EUROPE. 2019. Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 217. Additional 
Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism Status as of 
17/05/2019. Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/
treaty/217/signatures?p_auth=wdVkbo0R.
37  The Czech Act No. 287/2018 Coll. amended the Criminal Code No. 90/2009 Coll. in the sense of 
the above-mentioned directive. A similar Slovak law is Act No. 161/2018 Coll., which amended 
the Slovak Criminal Code No. 300/2005 Coll. New criminal offences were also added to the 
Hungarian and Polish criminal codes. MICHALSKA-WARIAS, Aneta. 2018. New Terrorist Offences 
in Polish Criminal Law. Annales UMCS, Vol. 65, No. 1, 103-114.
38  This issue is connected also with the problem of (non-)intervention in cases of prosecution 
and sentencing (including the death penalty) in Iraq or Syria of the Islamic state fighters with 
EU citizenships. SCHERRE, Amandine – ISAKSSON, Cecilia – RAGAZZI, Francesco – WALMSLEY, 
Josh. 2018. The return of foreign fighters to EU soil. Ex-post Evaluation. Brussels. European 
Parliamentary Research Service. Available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/
etudes/STUD/2018/621811/EPRS_STU(2018)621811_EN.pdf.
39  ROITHMAIER, Kilian. 2019. Germany and its Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters: New Loss of 
Citizenship Law and the Broader German Repatriation Landscape. ICCT. Available at: https://icct.
nl/publication/germany-and-its-returning-foreign-terrorist-fighters-new-loss-of-citizenship-
law-and-the-broader-german-repatriation-landscape/.
40  HASSAN, Ahmad Saiful Rijal. 2018. Deradicalising Returning Foreign Fighters: Lessons from 
Denmark. RSiS. Available at: https://www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/icpvtr/deradicalising-
returning-foreign-fighters-lessons-from-denmark/#.XN76UPZuIdU.
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concerning the FF” (it was established in 2014).41 The phenomenon of foreign fighters 
(including Jihadist foreign fighters) was one of the main topics of the meeting of the 
“V4+242 counter extremist group” in 2015.43 Unfortunately, this form of cooperation has 
not developed further in recent years. International counter-Jihadist cooperation is able 
to overcome the tensions in other fields of international relations, as the case of Pol-
ish-Russian collaboration against the Chechen foreign fighter Azamat Bajdujew shows. 
He fought in IS, was arrested in Poland and extradited to Russia in 2018.44
Furthermore, FTFs pose a specific challenge to national security systems and inter-
-agency cooperation in the V4 countries. FTFs are an issue that affects both the internal 
and external security of the state, and both military and non-military security. It means 
that both civil (police, security and intelligence agencies etc.) and military (intelligence, 
special forces etc.) institutions are forced to cooperate in this field. In countries with 
a strict division of powers between law enforcement agencies and intelligence servi-
ces (in V4 mostly the Czech Republic and Slovakia) the use of intelligence agencies’ 
knowledge during trials of FTFs remains an unsolved challenge for the criminal proce-
dural law.45
CONCLUSION 
Jihadist foreign terrorist fighters are considered a significant threat by the global se-
curity community as well as by regional European security structures. East Central Eu-
ropean countries are not as seriously and directly affected by this problem as Western 
European or Balkan countries are. However, due to the interconnection and transna-
tionalisation of contemporary security policies, they do take these problems seriously. 
Several tens of fighters from East Central European countries have joined Jihadist groups 
in the Middle East during the past decade.
Returnees from these countries have not been directly involved in the preparation of 
terrorist attacks (as far as is known) and there is no evidence of these people serving in 
the roles of recruiters or veterans (one killed Polish Jihadist can be labelled as a martyr). 
41  GINKEL et al. 
42  Visegrád countries + Germany and Austria. 
43  VLÁDA ČR. 2015. Program českého předsednictví ve Visegrádské skupině v letech 2015–2016. 
Ministerstvo zahraničních věcí ČR. Available at: https://www.vlada.cz/assets/evropske-
zalezitosti/visegradska-skupina/Program-a-priority-CZ-V4-PRES.pdf.
44  MIEŚNIK, Magda. 2018. “Deportowany Czeczen walczył w szeregach Państwa Islamskiego”. 
Polska ujawnia powody deportacji. WP. Available at: https://wiadomosci.wp.pl/deportowany-
czeczen-walczyl-w-szeregach-panstwa-islamskiego-polska-ujawnia-powody-deportacji-
6301980027611265a.
45  Of course, this issue is connected not just with the FTFs, but with a broader spectrum of 
security threats. POKORNÝ, Ladislav. 2018. Jest zvažovati důkazní použití odposlechu pořízeného 
zpravodajskou službou? In KALVODOVÁ, Věra, Marek FRYŠTÁK a Jan PROVAZNÍK (eds.). Trestní 
právo /stále/ v pohybu: pocta Vladimíru Kratochvílovi. Brno: Masarykova univerzita, 281-294.
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However, FTFs from Western Europe responsible for terrorist attacks travelled through 
the Visegrád countries and some of them used that territory for longer visits. The se-
curity forces of the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland have successfully de-
tained and/or monitored many FTFs; however, only a few cases have been decided by 
the courts and some suspects were not detected in time. 
A set of new EU norms have been adopted. It is important to evaluate the efficiency 
of these norms and their use by national police and judicial bodies. Findings should be 
discussed at sub-regional as well as European level. Inter-agency cooperation and the 
capability to share and together to assess threats are requested at the national level. 
A re-start of V4+2 cooperation with a broader spectrum of participants (including in the 
military sphere) should help to counter Jihadist FTFs. Strong Euro-Atlantic cooperation 
and the involvement of credible partners in various parts of the world (mostly in sharing 
information, efficient law enforcement and efficient military combat against the terrorist 
structures in conflict areas) will remain the most important tasks for the future.
This paper was written under the research project OPTIZ “Optimization of Intel-
ligence Activities and Intelligence Institutions in the Changing Environment” (OP-
TIZ9070204510), funded by the Ministry of Defence of the Czech Republic (“Develop-
ment of the Armed Forces of the Czech Republic” defence research programme).
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